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Nuclear	weapons	dominate	North	Korea’s	foreign
and	domestic	policy;	diplomatic	engagement	is	the
only	way	to	encourage	regime	change.
Recent	months	have	seen	rising	rhetoric	between	Washington	DC	and	Pyongyang	over	North
Korea’s	nuclear	weapons	program.	But	why	is	the	North	Korean	regime	so	keen	on	developing	such
weapons?	Vuk	Vuksanovic	argues	that	for	North	Korea’s	Kim	Jong	Un	nuclear	weapons	act	as	a
deterrent	to	international	intervention,	an	instrument	of	foreign	policy,	and	as	a	way	of	maintaining
support	domestically.	With	such	a	powerful	pull,	he	writes,	such	weapons	will	not	be	easily	given	up
by	North	Korea.	
North	Korea	has	been	back	in	the	news	since	reports	emerged	that	the	regime	in	Pyongyang	was	close	to
developing	nuclear-tipped	intercontinental	ballistic	missiles	(ICBM)	able	to	hit	the	US.	This	news	led	to	an
inflammable	exchange	of	rhetoric	in	which	North	Korean	leader	Kim	Jong	Un	threatened	to	strike	the	US	island
territory	of	Guam,	and	to	which	President	Donald	Trump	replied	with	a	promise	to	Pyongyang	that	it	would	be	met
	with	“fire	and	fury”.	Later	on,	North	Korea	fired	a	missile	over	Japan	that	crashed	into	the	sea,	which	they	then
followed	by	a	hydrogen	bomb	test	considered	by	some	to	be	the	country’s	most	powerful	so	far.	The	threatening
rhetoric	has	continued	as	Donald	Trump	in	his	speech	to	the	UN	General	Assembly	threatened	to	“totally	destroy”
North	Korea,	while	North	Korea’s	Foreign	Minister	compared	the	US’	rhetoric	with	the	declaration	of	war.	So	why
does	North	Korea	want	nuclear	weapons?	For	the	North	Korean	regime,	nuclear	weapons	have	three	strategic
functions,	and	with	each	one,	the	US	is	right	in	the	center.	Firstly,	they	serve	as	deterrent;	secondly,	an
instrument	of	foreign	policy;	and	thirdly,	they	are	an	instrument	of	domestic	politics.
A	hedge	against	international	intervention
The	first	function	of	North	Korea’s	nuclear	weapons	is	self-evident.	Its	leadership	is	faced	with	an	adverse
international	system,	in	which	the	world’s	preeminent	power,	the	US,	is	focused	on	changing	the	regime	in	that
country.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	US	Secretary	of	State	Rex	Tillerson	has	denied	this,	Kim	Jong	Un	can	hardly
take	anyone’s	word	when	it	comes	to	his	own	survival.	Indeed,	cases	of	countries,	which	gave	up	on	nuclear
weapons	only	to	become	targets	of	great	power	interventions	later	on,	such	as	Ukraine	or	Iraq	and	Libya	can
hardly	be	encouraging	for	Kim	Jong	Un.	If	we	presume	that	the	North	Korean	regime	does	not	operate	with	a
suicidal-apocalyptic	tendency,	as	scaremongers	proclaim,	but	on	a	rational	presumption	that	every	political
regime	wants	to	survive,	first	and	foremost,	then	having	nuclear	weapons	is	its	logical	course	of	action.	As	the
international	relations	theory	teaches	us,	nuclear	weapons	remain	the	best	safeguard	against	foreign	invasion.
The	late	legend	of	international	relations	theory	Kenneth	Waltz	also	considered	North	Korea’s	pursuit	of	nuclear
weapons	a	reasonable	strategy	given	that	the	regime’s	biggest	security	concern	is	the	possibility	of	US-led
military	intervention,	in	which	Pyongyang	would	never	stand	a	chance.	The	possibility	that	the	Trump
administration	could	undermine	2015’s	negotiated	nuclear	deal	between	Iran	and	the	international	community	is
giving	North	Korean	fears	additional	stimuli.
An	instrument	of	foreign	policy
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The	second	function	relates	to	the	fact	that	unlike	most	countries	that	primarily	view	nuclear	weapons	as	the
means	of	deterrent,	the	regime	in	Pyongyang	views	them	as	an	instrument	of	foreign	policy.	While	South	Korea
has	become	one	of	the	world’s	most	advanced	economies,	the	North	Korean	regime	is	one	of	the	most	isolated
regimes	with	a	backward	economy.	As	such,	if	you	are	North	Korea,	being	ignored	by	the	international	community
is	a	very	dangerous	thing,	given	that	with	the	passage	of	time,	the	chances	for	the	collapse	of	the	repressive
isolated	regime,	with	outdated	ideology,	unable	to	bring	economic	wellbeing	to	its	citizens,	increases.	Instead,	the
nuclear	weapons	therefore	provide	leverage	and	a	bargaining	chip	with	the	US	that	North	Korea	can	employ
when	diplomatically	interacting	with	more	powerful	and	more	successful	actors,	like	the	US	and	its	ally	South
Korea.	We	have	already	seen	this	on	the	14th	of	August	2017,	when	Kim	Jong	Un	signaled	a	pause	on	the
potential	decision	to	strike	Guam,	leaving	that	way	open	space	for	talks,	in	which	the	Pyongyang	regime	could	try
to	gain	concessions	from	Washington.
There	are	numerous	ways	in	which	Pyongyang	has	been	using	nuclear	weapons	as	a	tool	of	political	leverage.
Even	before	becoming	a	nuclear	state,	Pyongyang	has	been	using	its	nuclear	program	as	a	way	of	influencing
the	US	to	relieve	the	extent	of	the	sanctions	it	has	imposed,	which	is	a	pattern	of	behavior	dating	back	to	the
Clinton	administration.	One	of	Donald	Trump’s	Tweets	confirmed	this	when	it	asserted	that	the	US	has	been
paying	extortion	money	to	North	Korea	for	the	past	25	years.
The	U.S.	has	been	talking	to	North	Korea,	and	paying	them	extortion	money,	for	25	years.	Talking	is
not	the	answer!
—	Donald	J.	Trump	(@realDonaldTrump)	August	30,	2017
North	Korea	has	also	used	its	nuclear	weapons	tests	as	a	bargaining	chip	in	talks	with	the	US,	concerning	the
humanitarian	aid	badly	needed	by	the	North	Korean	populace.	One	of	the	“points”	that	Pyongyang	scored	in	this
area	in	the	past	was	the	February	2012	agreement	known	as	“Leap	Day”	agreement.	This	agreement	made	with
the	Obama	administration	guaranteed	that	Pyongyang	would	refrain	from	testing	nuclear	weapons	in	exchange
for	food	aid	from	the	US.	The	regime	in	Pyongyang	has	also	tended	to	leverage	Washington	and	Seoul	to	give	up
on	military	drills	that	Pyongyang	perceives	as	potentially	threatening,	in	exchange	for	moratorium	on	nuclear
tests.	This	bargaining	worked	for	North	Korea	in	2015	and	it	could	be	potentially	be	effective	now	amidst	military
drills	by	the	US	and	South	Korea.	Threatening	with	nuclear	weapons	and	the	game	of	diplomatic	trading	with	the
US	that	North	Korea	puts	in	motion	can	also	be	used	as	a	way	to	weaken	or	dilute	an	alliance	between
Washington	and	Seoul.	Ultimately,	nuclear	weapons	talks	might	also	be	employed	in	the	long	run	so	that	North
Korea	can	get	the	diplomatic	recognition	and	acceptance	of	its	nuclear	status,	which	is	something	that	“only
Washington”	can	provide.
Shoring	up	support	at	home
Last	but	not	least,	the	North	Korean	regime	uses	its	nuclear	weapons	as	an	instrument	to	strengthen	itself
domestically.	There	is	a	well-established	assertion	among	political	science	wonks	that	the	presence	of	an
international	threat	boosts	the	cohesion	of	the	state,	while	the	absence	of	the	threat	brings	the	state’s	internal
social	and	political	divisions	to	the	fore.	Given	the	fear	that	isolated,	economically	deprived	population	could	rebel
against	the	regime,	it	is	useful	for	Kim	Jong	Un	to	have	an	external	enemy	so	that	the	country’s	population	can
rally	around	his	strong	leadership.	The	US	is	the	perfect	bogeyman	for	North	Korea	to	strengthen	social	and
political	cohesion	of	its	society	and	nuclear	weapons	are	perfect	way	to	generate	faith	among	those	living	under
the	regime’s	rule.		This	pattern	is	evident	from	the	mass	propaganda	rally	on	August	9th	in	Pyongyang.	A	series	of
similar,	anti-US	propaganda	rallies	have	been	taking	place	in	North	Korea	as	reaction	to	Trump’s	UN	speech.
Furthermore,	despite	the	totalitarian	character	of	North	Korea’s	political	system,	Kim	Jong	Un	also	has	to	deal
with	domestic	power	brokers,	convince	them	of	his	strengths	and	when	necessary	to	eliminate	any	potential
rivals.	In	one	of	the	less	dramatic	analyses,	Kim	Jong	Un	was	described	as	the	CEO	who	has	to	ensure	his
shareholders	and	other	board	members	that	he	is	steering	the	company	in	the	right	way.
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“North	Korea	—	Pyongyang”	by	(stephan)	is	licensed	under	CC	BY	2.0
For	Kim	Jong	Un,	nuclear	weapons	are	a	way	to	prove	to	his	power	entourage	from	the	military	and	the	Workers’
Party	of	Korea	that	he	is	a	strong	leader	and	a	worthy	heir	to	his	late	father	Kim	Jong	Il.		Kim	Jong	Un	already
applied	such	strategy	during	the	plenary	session	of	the	Party	Central	Committee	of	2013	where	he	promised	that
the	regime	would	simultaneously	concentrate	on	strengthening	both	the	country’s	nuclear	capability	and	its
economic	performance.	That	entire	period	was	also	marked	by	North	Korean	nuclear	tests	and	verbal	threats
against	the	US	and	South	Korea.	The	need	for	Kim	Jong	Un	to	remain	strong	is	particularly	acute	given	that	his
ascendance	to	power	in	2012	was	marked	with	power	struggle	entailing	purges	and	dismissal	of	prominent	party
and	army	figures.		Moreover,	not	even	his	family	is	immune	from	power	struggles.	Kim	Jong	Il	had	been
appointed	heir	to	his	father	Kim	Il	Sung	after	outmaneuvering	other	family	members.	In	2013,	Kim	Jong	Un
executed	Jang	Song-thaek,	his	own	uncle,	out	of	fear	that	he	was	too	powerful.	Most	recently	in	2017,	Kim	Jong
Un’s	estranged	half-brother	Kim	Jong	Na	was	killed	at	the	Kuala	Lumpur	airport,	after	being	poisoned	with	a
nerve	agent.	In	such	an	environment,	one	cannot	appear	weak,	and	being	in	control	of	nuclear	weapons	is	part	of
the	game	of	controlling	the	internal	power	ranks.
Diplomatic	engagement:	playing	the	long	game
Given	that	for	the	regime	in	Pyongyang,	nuclear	weapons	are	not	just	a	guarantor	of	regime’s	survival	but	also	a
tool	of	power	play	in	interacting	with	external	power	and	domestic	political	players;	it	is	highly	unlikely	that	the
regime	will	simply	give	them	away	despite	pressures	from	the	US.	The	military	option	for	removing	the	weapons
is	not	realistic,	as	it	is	dangerous	and	unreliable.	Economic	sanctions	will	also	not	remove	nuclear	weapons	as
one	would	have	to	enact	enormous	economic	damage	to	the	regime,	which	appears	unviable,	given	that	China
will	never	go	that	far.	Furthermore,	states	faced	with	security	threats	and	challenges	are	willing	to	bear	enormous
economic	sacrifice	for	the	sake	of	their	security	interests.	The	only	plausible	option	is	to	engage	North	Korea
diplomatically,	as	it	was	done	with	Iran	with	participation	of	interested	parties,	in	this	case	China,	Japan,	South
Korea,	and	Russia.	There	are	reasonable	skeptics	who	believe	that	the	approach	which	was	effective	with	Iran
will	not	work	in	case	of	North	Korea,	but	it	is	better	than	the	alternative	of	cornering	a	paranoid	and	erratic	nuclear
regime.	This	diplomatic	engagement	would	not	eliminate	North	Korean	nuclear	weapons,	but	it	could	be	used	to
open	up	the	country	for	foreign	investment.
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An	economically	opened	North	Korea	that	is	simultaneously	exposed	to	the	information	influx	from	the	outside
world	would	be	more	susceptible	to	gradual	liberalization	and	perhaps	a	regime	replacement	someday.	As	Ian
Bremmer	satirically	tweeted	once	“Cuba’s	communism	survived	50	years	of	sanctions.	I	doubt	they	can	survive	5
years	of	Starbucks”.	The	same	applies	to	North	Korea.	One	thing	is	for	certain,	given	the	important	roles	that
nuclear	weapons	play	for	Pyongyang,	no	other	course	of	action	seems	viable.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.													
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